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THE SUPREME COURT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
AND STATE LEGISLATION
Vincent M. Barnett, .Tr.*

R

ECENT decisions have revealed a growing rift in the Supreme
Court on the question of the effect of the commerce clause on
state legislation. This question, a perennial one in our constitutional
history, concerns state legislation affecting in some way or other the
carrying on of interstate business, and the validity of that legislation
in view of the clause giving Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. The permissible scope of state activity in the absence
of Congressional action has been the troublesome problem. If Congress
acts, the issue is a relatively simple one. When the state action conflicts
with federal legislation, the former is invalid. When Congress has not
acted, however, it devolves upon the Supreme Court (according to the
traditional approach, under its own reasoning at least) to decide
whether the state law impinges on the unexercised Congressional
authority. The Court from the beginning has devoted much of its
time to the laborious task of working out rules and formulae with
which to scrutinize state legislation challenged on this basis. These
principles have undergone noticeable evolution and alteration through
the years, but the Court has consistently attempted to find some logical
basis for elaborating the implications of the "dormant" commerce
power.
Now, however, there appears to be an increasingly significant tendency on the part of some of the justices to abandon this heroic effort
and to find a different basis for the exposition of the commerce clause
with regard to state legislation in the silence of Congress. The position
is more often taken that state laws exhibiting no actual discrimination
against interstate commerce should be upheld regardless of their "effect" on such commerce. This is probably still a minority view, but
there are some indications that the Court is being pushed or will be
pushed in that direction. Some of the most interesting cases relating
to state laws challenged under the commerce clause have come since
I937 and revolve around this particular problem.
On February I2, r940, three justices of the Supreme Court advocated that the courts leave to Congress the solution to the problem of
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"the constantly increasing barriers to trade among the states." Justices
Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, dissenting from a majority opinion
invalidating a state tax on gasoline carried in the tanks of interstate
trucks and busses, urged that the reconciliation of the conflicting demands in this field could best be handled by the federal legislature.
" ... Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative
regulations-must from inherent limitations of the judicial process
treat the subject by the hit and miss method of deciding single
local controversies upon evidence and information limited by the
narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic and unrelated instances of
litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford that full protection
for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution." 1
This view is of considerable significance. It recognizes that the exposition of the commerce clause in relation to state legislation has in the
past been carried on for the most part by the federal judiciary. It
postulates, moreover, that this effort has not been wholly successful
and that, in spite of determined effort by the courts, the barriers to
trade among the states are "constantly increasing." If adopted by the
majority of the Court, it would mean the abandonment of the longstanding attempt of the federal judiciary to supervise state commercial
regulations in the "silence of Congress."
The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have for many
years been invalidating state tax and police power laws which, in the
opinion of the judges, constitute a burden upon interstate commerce.
So long as the courts were doing this work, there was no particular
pressure upon Congress to use its admittedly broad powers over interstate commerce to eliminate trade barriers among the states. Yet,
despite the high mortality rate among state laws challenged on this
basis, the problem of these interstate trade barriers has in recent years
become one of the most insistent and perplexing questions in our entire
federal system. Numerous studies indicate that, regardless of the fact
that the courts have been striking down state laws as imposing undue
obstructions upon interstate commerce, trade walls between the states
have been built higher and higher with the passing years. 2 Quarantine
1 McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,
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2 MELDER, STATE AND LocAL BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE CoMMERCE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1937); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, BARRIERS
TO INTERNAL TRADE IN FARM PRODUCTS (1939); MARKETING LAWS SURVEY OF
WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE CHARTS OF STATE STATUTES ILLUSTRATING BARRIERS TO TRADE BETWEEN THE STATES
TARIFF
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laws, inspection laws, tax measures, port-of-entry laws, statutes giving
preference to resident firms, regulations of nonresident motor carriers,
all stand on state statute books in such a way as to create a growing
problem in national commercial relations. 3
The growing recognition of the extent of the problem and the
indications of a possible shift in Supreme Court attitude on this question make it highly interesting to review the history of judicial attempts to work out the implications of the commerce clause with regard
to state legislation. In this connection the record of the past fifty years
is worthy of special consideration. It has been a half-century of applying general doctrines, first evolved by Marshall and Taney, in a period
of mushrooming commercial activity coupled with a rapidly increasing
number of state laws dealing with this activity. The major doctrinal
principles had all been worked out in general terms prior to I 890.
There had been changes in emphasis in the transition of the Court
from the Marshall perjod to the Taney period, and some of the doctrines as announced at various stages in the Court's earlier history were
partially or wholly inconsistent with one another.4 But most of them
remained as a part of the judicial armory which could be drawn upon
when these cases began to come up with almost bewildering frequency.
The story of the fifty years from I 890 to I 940 is the story of the
dogged attempt to systematize and apply in some reasonable manner
this confusing and somewhat inconsistent body of thought inherited
from a day when federal legislation under the commerce clause was
almost nonexistent and state laws involving interstate commerce were
far from numerous as judged by later-day standards. In the periods
before 1890, the Supreme Court had concerned itself with defining
the meaning of the provision and ascertaining its e:ffect on the distribution of powers between state and nation. The nature of the economic
conditions of the country taken together with a strong political philos8
According to figures presented by MELDER, STATE TRADE WALLS (1939)
(Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 37), most states in doing their own purchasing for public
purposes discriminate in favor of resident businesses. Twenty-six states require public
printing contracts to be awarded only to resident printing firms. Twenty-eight states
by law require that local products be used when buying supplies for public institutions
or materials for the construction of public works. Id. 4-5. More important than these
laws relating to the proprietary activities of the states, however, are the following: 3 I
states have laws discriminating against out-of-state wines, beers, and liquors; 30 states
have margarine excise or license taxes to protect local dairy or oil interests; 29 states
have quarantine laws "with economic barrier features." These figures are as of April 1,
1939. See COUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, TRADE BARRIERS AMoNG THE STATES
(1939) (Proceedings of the National Conference on Interstate Trade Barriers).
4
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE (1937).
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ophy of laissez-faire had made unnecessary any resort to wide regulation in the field of commerce. It was not until after the Civil War that
the states began to pass legislation relating to commercial matters on
an important scale, and it was not until after about I 890 that a similar
trend is to be noticed in the activities of the federal government.
In what has been called the era of judicial exposition of the commerce clause, 5 several different criteria were resorted to in an effort
to simplify what was destined to be a difficult task. The formula by
which the distribution of powers between the nation and the states was
to be achieved was sought first in the "m.ture of the power over commerce." In subsequent decisions this was supplemented by reference to
the "subjects of the power" as an important criterion. Again, when
Congress finally began to become active in the field, the "will of Congress" came to be cited as a signficant factor in defining the sphere of
state operations in relation to interstate commerce. The result of these
shifts in emphasis was the concept of a so-called "concurrent" power
over commerce determined by the particular subject regulated. This
view, which has sometimes been referred to as the doctrine of "selective
exclusiveness," held that if the subject required national regulation the
states could not act even in the absence of federal legislation covering
the matter. If, on the other hand, the subject was deemed to be one
not requiring uniform national regulation, the states were empowered
to act until Congress positively exerted its power. The Court continued,
however, to refer in many cases to the "exclusive" power of Congress
in almost unqualified terms reminiscent of Marshall.6 The doctrine
of "selective exclusiveness" raised the question who was to determine
whether a particular subject required uniformity of regulation. In the
early cases the Court seemed to assume that this was simply a fact
capable of judicial ascertainment. Slowly this was replaced by the practice of referring to Congress as the agency to determine this line of
demarcation. The intent of Congress became the deciding factorparticularly so long as Congress remained relatively inactive-and inferences as to that body's fictitious intent were freely drawn from its
silence. 7 The pronouncement that a state law was "a regulation of inter5

See RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL PowER OVER CoMMERCE (1937).
An excellent discussion of this doctrinal development is found in Ribble's work,
cited supra.
·
7
According to one writer, it might be said that in the silence of Congress the
Court itself assumed the function of regulating interstate commerce. The rules it applied in any given case were founded on its own notions of expediency, not upon the
mandates of Congress nor the expressed intentions of the framers of the Constitution.
The silence of Congress was held to have variable effects. In numerous cases it was
6
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state commerce" was thus used ambiguously. It might mean, if approached from the subject-matter point of view, nothing at all so far
as the constitutionality of the law was concerned. That is to say, the
law might be valid, since certain subjects did not require a uniform rule
and hence the states might "regulate" that kind of "commerce" until
Congress acted. In another sense, however, the phrase was often used
by the Court as equivalent to a declaration of invalidity. State laws
considered as placing a "burden" on interstate commerce were often
referred to merely as constituting a "regulation" of interstate commerce
and hence void.
These various criteria of the actual scope of the commerce clause,
although they succeeded one another, did not by any means displace
their predecessors. On the contrary, all remained as possible instruments for the use of the Court in expounding the clause. The application of these ideas to a rapidly changing commercial world and to the
vast mass of growing state legislation after l 890 is the chief concern
of the remainder of this paper. For purposes of convenience, in
handling the mass of factual data involved in such a study, the fiftyyear period has been divided into two parts. State legislation challenged
under the commerce clause during the period l 890-1920 is considered
first, with special attention to tax legislation and police power legislation. A subsequent section deals with such legislation in the period
1921-1940. Some remarks on the present status of the interpretation
of this clause with respect to state legislation close the discussion.
STATE LEGISLATION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

(1890-1920)

Tax Legislation

In this period there were l 13 cases in which state taxes were challenged on the ground that they were in conflict with the commerce
power of the federal government. In 3 5 of these, the state statute was
invalidated. Moreover, in the latter part of the period a growing proportion of findings of unconstitutionality is to be noted. From 1890 to 1905
there were 54 cases with l 3 resulting in invalidation, while from 1906 to
1920 there were 59 cases with 22· resulting in decisions of unconstiheld that the silence of Congress indicated that body's will that such commerce should
be unregulated. In other cases, in which state legislation was upheld, it was often said
that the silence of Congress was a declaration of intention not to disturb what existed
and that Congress was in effect adopting state law. Shenton, "Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress," 23 D1cKINSoN L. REv. 78, 107, 139 (1919).
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tutionality. 8 Most of these statutes involved taxes on railroads, telegraph companies, express companies, the liquor trade, and the privilege
of foreign corporations to do business in the state. There were in this
period 32 cases involving taxation of foreign corporations on business
done within the state, 20 cases involving railroads, r2 affecting express
companies, r I affecting telegraph companies, 8 involving the regulation
of the liquor trade, and a few scattered cases concerning bridges across
interstate streams, ferries, and grain elevators. There was, in addition,
a miscellany of cases dealing with taxation of speculators, of coal
stored for interstate shipment, on grazing of cattle in interstate commerce, on ships with foreign situs, and various other matters.
A brief survey of some of these cases will serve to illustrate some
of the problems which the Court encountered in attempting to apply
inconsistent and confusing concepts worked out by early decisions to
the solution of problems arising from overlapping tax systems which
were growing more and more complex as the economy developed. In
I 890 the Court voided a state statute imposing a license tax on foreign
corporations as applied to a railroad connecting with interstate lines.°
Soon after, however, it upheld a tax on a railroad company's capital
stock measured by the proportion of track within the state,10 and approved a tax on railroad property in the state, including rolling stock.11
This recognition of the so-called "unit rule" of taxation led to the
upholding of state laws taxing stock or property of interstate businesses
based on some reasonable measurement of the proportion of intrastate
business to the whole. A tax on the stock of a telegraph company
measured by the proportion of lines within the state was ruled valid.12
Likewise, taxes on express companies based on business done within
the state were upheld.13 Numerous state laws taxing railroad property
or capital stock on this basis were sustained, even though the companies
were admittedly in interstate commerce.14 However, state taxes which
8

The writer wishes to express his deep indebtedness to Professor Benjamin F.
Wright, Jr., of Harvard University, for access to his invaluable card catalogue of cases
on state laws challenged in the Supreme Court of the United States. Much of the statistical material in this paper is based on a study of those files.
9 Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. II4, IO S. Ct. 958 (1890).
10
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, II S. Ct. 876 (1891).
11
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Hayward, 141 U.S. 36, II S. Ct. 883 (1891).
12
Massachusetts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40, II S. Ct. 889
(1891).
. '
13
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 12 S. Ct. 250 (1892).
14
Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217, 12 S. Ct. 121, 163 (1891);
Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 12 S. Ct. 806 (1892); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 14 S. Ct. III4 (1894); New
·
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did not apply such a standard,15 or applied an unreasonable standard,16
were condemned. The application of this "unit rule" to the taxation of
telegraph companies 17 and express companies 18 was very generally
upheld. Shortly before the close of the period under consideration, one
of the leading "unit rule" cases was decided. In this instance, a Georgia
statute taxing a New Jersey tank line company on the use of its tank
cars in the state, and basing the tax on the value of this rolling stock
as part of the entire system of cars owned and operated by the company,
was condernned.19 With three justices dissenting, the Court, speaking
through Justice McReynolds, differentiated the case from the Pullman's Palace Car case 20 and found that the "unit rule" as here applied
was unreasonable and constituted a taxation of and a burden upon
interstate commerce. Another leading case decided shortly before this
had ruled that an income tax on a domestic corporation, based on gains
and profits from its entire business, including in the computation the
net income from transactions in interstate commerce, was a valid exercise of state taxing power. Justice Pitney, for the Court, held that the
burden on interstate commerce in this instance was merely an "indirect"
one.21
Following Paut v. Virginia, 22 the Court continued to hold in many
cases that the state could prescribe the conditions under which foreign
corporations could do business within its borders, and could tax such
corporations for the privilege of carrying on this business. Taxes on
York, L. E. & W.R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431, 15 S. Ct. 896 (1895); Ohio
Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 34 S. Ct. 372 (1914).
15 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 S. Ct. 638 (1908).
16
Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 40 S. Ct. 435 (1920).
17 Massachusetts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40, II S. Ct. 889
(1891); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Gottlieb, 190 U. S. 412,
23 S. Ct. 730 (1903). See also, Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688,
15 S. Ct. 268 (1895); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419,
23 S. Ct. 204 (1903); and Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252,
39 S. Ct. 265 (1919).
18
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 12 S. Ct. 250 (1892); Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 S. Ct. 305 (1897); Adams
Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171, 17 S. Ct. 527 (1897); Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Nevada, 248 U.S. 165, 39 S. Ct. 62 (1918). But see Meyer v. Wells, Fargo &
Co., 223 U. S. 298, 32 S. Ct. 218 (1912).
19 Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 39 S. Ct. 276 (1919).
20 Pullman's Palace Car v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, I I S. Ct. 876 (1891),
mentioned at note 10, supra.
21
United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499
(1918).
22
8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 168 (1869).
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foreign corporations measured by corporate dividends or capital stock,28
, taxes on the sale of stock of foreign corporations in the state,24 occupation or license taxes on agents of foreign corporations selling or delivering merchandise within the state, 25 privilege taxes based upon gross
earnings within the state,26 all were upheld by the Court as not violating the national commerce power. There is, however, considerable
evidence in this period of a retreat from the sweeping dicta in Paul
v. Virginia as to the state's control over foreign corporations, both in
tax cases and in cases involving other types of legislation.21 In the tax
litigation, it is to be noted that coincident with the line of cases upholding state power in this regard, the Court was voiding statutes imposing
taxes on canvassers and solicitors for out-of-state manufacturers,28
taxes on agents selling goods of foreign corporations to wholesalers
within the state,29 and franchise taxes on foreign corporations based on
28
Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 12 S. Ct. 403 (1892);
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 34 S. Ct. 15 (1913); St. Louis
S.. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 S. Ct. 99 (1914); Cheney Bros. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 38 S. Ct. 295 (1918); General Ry. Signal Co. v.
Virginia, 246 U. S. · 500, 38 S. Ct. 360 (1918); Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 45 (1920).
24
New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 27 S. Ct. 188 (1907).
25
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 15 S. Ct. 367 (1895); American Steel
& Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365 (1904); Banker Bros. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210, 32 S. Ct. 38 (1911); Browning v. Waycross, 233 U.S.
16, 34 S. Ct. 578 (1914); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304,
34S. Ct. 493 (1914); Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1, 38 S. Ct. 267 (1918);
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 498, 38 S. Ct. 361 (1918}; Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95, 40 S. Ct. 93 (1919).
26
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 38 S. Ct. 373 (1918).
21 The modification of Paul v. Virginia is to be found not only in the more rigorous scrutiny accorded state tax laws as applied to foreign corporations. In other types
of legislation as well, the Court was disposed to look somewhat less kindly on the activities of the state. See Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 27 S. Ct. 159 (1906).
Note also a series of cases denying the right of the states to close their courts to foreign
corporations unless certain conditions prescribed by the states were satisfied. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 S. Ct. 481 (1910); Buck Stove &
Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205, 33 S. Ct. 41 (1912); Harrison v. St. Louis &
S. F. R.R., 232 U.S. 318, 34 S. Ct. 333 (1914); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235
U. S. 197, 35 S. Ct. 57 (1914).
28
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 S. Ct. 829 (1894); Caldwell v.
North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 23 S. Ct. 229 (1903); Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U.S.
124, 30 S. Ct. 649 (1910); Crenshaw v. Alabama, 227 U. S. 389, 33 S. Ct. 294
(1913); Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346, 37 S. Ct. 623 (1917);
Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 665, 34 S. Ct. 476 (1914).
211 Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27, 22 S. Ct. 576 (1902).
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a percentage of their total capital stock.80 Of course, it should be remembered that some of these statutes were attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the commerce clause, and that in some
instances the statute stood condemned because of its intrinsic "unreasonableness."
In the multitude of decisions affecting state taxing power in relation to interstate commerce in this period, the Court was endeavoring
to achieve two purposes. By a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion it was attempting to compel interstate carriers and interstate businesses to bear their share of the burden of state expenses, while at the
same time striving to protect their interstate business from burdensome
state regulation. The two naturally conflict and complete attainment
of both is probably impossible. From a doctrinal point of view, the
difficulties arose out of broad dicta to the effect that state taxation
must not burden or regulate interstate commerce, whereas what
actually had to be done was to eliminate only the unduly oppressive
burdens or regulations.
Police Power
A scrutiny of the cases arising under the police power of the states
involving statutes challenged under the national commerce power
reveals similar difficulties in the way of judicial application of the
commerce clause. In the exercise of this police power looking toward
the protection of health, safety, and morals, many state laws affecting
interstate commerce were upheld. Laws requiring the segregation of
whites and negroes on common carriers were ruled valid as applied to
interstate trains. 31 Laws requiring the inspection of fertilizers,82 beer
and malt liquors,83 hides,34 oils,85 feed,3° grain,87 and many other com30 Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 38 S. Ct. 85 (1917); International
Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 38 S. Ct. 292 (1918); Locomobile Co.
v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 146, 38 S. Ct. 298 (1918).
81
Louisville, N. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, IO S. Ct. 348 (1890);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 S. Ct. IOI (1900); South
Covington & C. St. Ry. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 399, 40 S. Ct. 378 (1920).
82
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345,
18 S. Ct. 862 (1898).
38
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U.S. 17, 25 S. Ct. 552 (1905).
34
New Mexico ex rel. E. J. McLean & Co. v. Denver & R. G. Ry., 203 U. S.
38, 27 s. Ct. I (1906).
85
General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475 (-1908); Red "C" Oil
Mfg. Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380, 32 S. Ct. 152
(1912); Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 39 S. Ct. 35 (1918).
86
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S. Ct. 715 (1912).
37
Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, 39 S. Ct. 114
(1919).
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modities coming into the state were sustained. On the other hand, several similar inspection laws were held invalid as applied to commodities
in interstate commerce. A Virginia statute requiring the inspection of
all fl.our brought into the state was condemned.38 A Maryland law
requiring inspection of oysters was invalidated on the ground that the
fees charged were in excess of the amount needed to defray the expenses of inspection.39 Similarly, a Washington statute providing for
inspection of petroleum was condemned on the ground that the fees
charged were excessive and hence constituted a "burden" on interstate
commerce.40 State laws excluding diseased sheep and cattle or injurious
commodities from being shipped in~o the state were generally upheld.4'1
Nevertheless, inspection laws which discriminated against other states
or laws excluding commodities in such a manner, in the Court's opinion,
as to burden interstate commerce were struck down. This latter line
of decisions stemmed from Minnesota v. Barber, 42 in which a state law,
requiring that all meat for human food must come from animals inspected by state inspectors twenty-four hours before being slaughtered,
was invalidated as discriminatory and as constituting a burden on interstate commerce. Following this a Virginia statute requiring local inspection of all fresh meat was condemned.48 Of twenty cases involving
inspection laws in this period, only five resulted in a declaration of
unconstitutionality. Three of these had been handed down by 189r
in the first three cases of this kind in the period.44 In the remaining
years of the period (r892-r920) only two of the seventeen inspection
Voight v. Wright, 141 u. s. 62, II s. Ct. 855 (1891).
Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 34 S. Ct. 377 (1914).
40
Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389, 39 S. Ct. 320 (1919).
41
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 S. Ct. 488 (1898),
diseased cattle; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 S. Ct. 154 (1894),
artificially colored oleomargarine; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 S. Ct. 132
(1900), cigarettes; Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 21 S. Ct. 594 (1901),
sheep from infected area; Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry., 181 U. S. 248, 21 S. Ct.
603 (1901), cattle quarantine; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92 (1902),
diseased cattle or horses; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 28 S. Ct. 485 (1908), inspection of cattle; Williams v. Walsh,. 222 U. S. 415, 32 S. Ct. 137 (1912), black
powder; Pricev. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446, 35 S. Ct. 892 (1915), pure food law; Armour
& Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 36 S. Ct. 440 (1916), lard compound; Hebe
Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S.297, 39 S. Ct. 125 (1919), canned milk; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 39 S. Ct. 325 (1919), pure food law.
42
136 u. s. 313, IO s. Ct. 862 (1890).
43
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, I I S. Ct. 213 (1891).
44
Minnesota v. Barber, I 36 U. S. 313, IO S. Ct. 862 ( I 890); Brimmer v.
Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, I I S. Ct. 213 (1891); and Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62,
I I s. Ct. 855 (1891).
38
39
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laws before the Court were invalidated.45 In both instances it was
ruled that the fees charged were higher than could be justified to cover
the costs of the inspection, and hence were a burden on interstate
commerce.
Although states were usually upheld in reasonable attempts to
prohibit the sale of commodities deemed by them injurious to their
citizens, a somewhat different picture was presented with regard to
the regulation of the liquor trade. In the period 1890-1920 there were
twenty-seven cases involving state regulation of the liquor trade, in
fifteen of which the legislation was deemed unconstitutional. Some of
these were tax measures and have been referred to above. Those falling
more properly within the police power as such seem to have followed
the lead of Leisy v. H ardin,46 in which an Iowa statute prohibiting the
sale of liquor was held invalid as applied to out-of-state shipments in
the original package. A similar law was upheld after the passage of
the Wilson Act,4'7 but liquor legislation continued to have more difficulty in the court than other types of police power statutes. In
Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co.48 a South Carolina law regulating the
sale of liquor brought into the state was held invalid as applied to that
brought in for private use. State laws declaring unlawful all shipments
of liquor C.O.D. and ruling that such shipments should be deemed
sales at the place where the goods were delivered were also held invalid as applied to interstate commerce.49 A Kentucky statute forbidding the sale of liquor to an habitual inebriate, when applied to a
common carrier bringing it from another state, was voided. 50 Another
statute of the same state made it unlawful for any common carrier to
transport liquor to any consignee in a locality within the state when the
sale of such liquor was prohibited by local option. This too was invalidated as applied to interstate shipments.51 Even after the WebbKenyon Act, which forbade transportation of liquor into a state
forbidding its sale or use, the application of a Kentucky law to a ship45

Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 34 S. Ct. 377 (1914), and Standard
Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389, 39 S. Ct. 320 (1919).
46
135 u. s. 100, IO s. Ct. 681 (1890).
47
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, II S. Ct. 865 (1891).
48
170 U.S. 438, 18 S. Ct. 674 (1898). Cf. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,
18 S. Ct. 664 (1898).
49
American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, 25 S. Ct. 182 (1905), and
Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 147, 25 S. Ct. 185 (1905).
50
Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 29 S. Ct. 633 (1909).
51
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70, 32 S. Ct. 189
(1912); see also Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 35 S. Ct. 419 (1915).
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ment from Tennessee to a person in Kentucky for his personal use
was held void.52 Justice Day held that the Webb-Kenyon law failed
to change the general rule that states may not regulate commerce
wholly interstate.
By far the most important subject of state legislation in this period
was the regulation of railroads. In all, there were 79 cases in which
state legislation dealing with railroads was challenged as in conflict
with the federal commerce power. Of these, 32 resulted in the voiding
of the state action. The accelerating rate of the judicial invalidation
of state laws may be seen here also. During the first half of the period
(1890-1905) there were 34 cases, of which only 9 resulted in invalidation of the statute. In the latter half (1906-1920), these figures
were 45 and 23 respectively. In comparison with the 79 cases affecting
railroads, those affecting all other utilities combined were 36, in 11 of
which the state laws were voided. The same acceleration both absolutely and proportionately in striking down of state laws can be noted
here as appeared in the railroad cases. From 1890 to 1905 there were
17 cases and only i invalidations, while from 1906 to 1920 there were
19 cases and 9 invalidations. In these cases involving other utilities,
telegraph companies figured most frequently. 53 There were a few
scattered cases involving grain elevators, bridges, ferries, street railways, and gas companies. The figures quoted in this paragraph are
based on all state legislation affecting railroads and utilities challenged
under the commerce clause. Many of these cases involved tax laws,
which have been commented upon above. The others, prescribing rates
and services, deserve some additional remarks here.
It may be said that the regulation of intrastate rates was generally
upheld,54 while laws regulating long and short haul rates affecting
interstate commerce 55 or fixing rates on shipments between points in
the state while moving toward an out-of-state destination 56 were invalidated. Several state laws were voided on the ground that they were
52

Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 29 S. Ct. 633 (1909).
There were 19 such cases, in 6 of which the law involved was invalidated.
54
Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U. S. 413, 14 S. Ct. 1060 (1894);
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913); Missouri Rate Cases,
230 U.S. 474, 33 S. Ct. 975 (1913); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Conley, 230 U. S.
513, 33 S. Ct. 985 (1913); Allen v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 230 U.S. 553, 33
S. Ct. 1030 (1913); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244 U.S. 191, 37
S. Ct. 522 (1917).
55
Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27, 22 S. Ct. 277 (1902).
56
Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 187 U. S. 617, 23 S. Ct. 214 (1903).
53
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superseded by or were in conflict with the Interstate Commerce Commission's rules or ordinances.57
While state regulation of intrastate rates was generally upheld>
attempts to regulate railroad services were often deemed an unnecessary burden on interstate commerce and declared unconstitutional. In
these cases a rough rule of reason had to be applied. State laws actually
regulating interstate commerce were frequently upheld if they were
reasonably adapted to protect local safety and did not unduly burden
interstate commerce. On the other hand, laws attempting merely to
promote local convenience were subjected to much more severe scrutiny
by the Court. For example, laws requiring interstate trains to make a
minimum number of stops or to stop at certain places in the statethe so-called "train-stop" cases-were sometimes upheld58 and sometimes invalidated 59 solely because the Court concluded that they
either did or did not tend unduly to impede interstate commerce in the
particular circumstances. Statutes prohibiting freight trains on Sunday,60 providing that cars should not be heated by inside stoves,81
regulating the speed of trains through cities,82 providing that trains
must slow down and whistle at crossings,88 requiring that all trains
in the state must use headlights of a certain size and power,84 were
all upheld. A notable exception to this tendency was a case in which
it was demonstrated that a state law requiring trains to slow down to
the prescribed speed at crossings would have added many hours to an
57
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 15 S. Ct. 802 (1895); Texas
& N. 0. R.R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. I II, 33 S Ct. 229 (1913); New York
Central & H. R.R. v. Hudson County, 227 U.S. 248, 33 S. Ct. 269 (1913).
58
In Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 16 S. Ct. 1096 (1896), a
law requiring all trains to stop at county seats was held unconstitutional, while a Minnesota statute requiring the same thing was upheld in Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S.
427, 17 S. Ct. 627 (1897). An Ohio law requiring three trains daily to stop at all
towns of 3,000 or more was held valid in Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. v.
Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 19 S. Ct. 465 (1899).
59
A Missouri law requiring trains to stop at all junctions was held unconstitutional
in Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 218 U. S. 135, 30 S. Ct. 633 (1901); a
Wis::onsin law requiring at least one passenger train a day to stop in every village having
a post office and 200 inhabitants was held unconstitutional in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.
v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 237 U.S. 220, 35 S. Ct. 560 (1915).
60
Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 S. Ct. 1086 (1896).
61
New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 17 S. Ct. 418
(1897).
82
Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 20 S. Ct. 819 (1900).
63
Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 30 S. Ct. 594 (1910).
H Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 34 S. Ct. 829 (1914).
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interstate journey. It was hence held a burden on interstate commerce
and unconstitutional.65
While these attempts to preserve the safety and promote the convenience of citizens were upheld, many other statutes seeking to provide for local convenience by regulating the services of railroads did
not fare so well. Laws making it the duty of railroads to trace lost
freight, 66 obliging them to provide freight cars upon demand of shippers,67 requiring them to receive cars from other railroads without discrimination,68 were all unconstitutional as applied to interstate commerce because of conflict with federal legislation, as were a number of
other similar attempts.69 Yet the flexibility of the criteria is demonstrated by the fact that laws prescribing the liability of carriers for the
safety of goods accepted for destination beyond the state line,7° requiring railroads to provide track connections with other lines,71 requiring carriers to settle claims for loss or damage ( even on shipments
from without the state) within a specified time,7 2 requiring railways to
interchange cars, freight and passengers with other lines in the interest
of adequate service,73 requiring the carriers to furnish cars within a
reasonable time after a demand for them was made,74 all were upheld
as not "regulatory," but· as only "incidentally affecting" interstate
commerce.
In these police power cases, then, the Court was following almost
wholly pragmatic principles, while calling upon the phraseology of
established doctrines to give them sanction. The decisions were made
with reference to the particular facts of the individual case after balSeaboard Airline Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 37 S. Ct. 640 (1917).
Central of Georgia Ry. v. Murphey, 196 U.S. 194, 25 S. Ct. 218 (1905).
67
Houston & Texas Central R. R. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 26 S. Ct. 491
(1906).
68
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U. S. 132, 29 S. Ct.
246 (1909).
69
Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 32 S. Ct. 140 (1912); Southern Ry.
v. Burlington Lumber Co., 225
S. 99, 32 S. Ct. 657 (1912); Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426, 33 S. Ct. 174 (1913); St.
Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 227 U. S. 265, 33 S. Ct. 262 (1913).
70 Richmond & A. R. R. v. Patterson Tobacco Co., I 69 U. S. 3 I 1, 18 S. Ct. 3 35
(1898); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. McCann, 174 U.S. 580, 19 S. Ct. 755 (1899).
71
Wisconsin, M. & P.R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287, 21 S. Ct. 115 (1900);
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 34 S. Ct. 152
(1913).
,
72
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mazursky, 216 U.S. 122, 30 S. Ct. 378 (1910).
73
Michigan Central R. R. v. Michigan Railroad Comm., 236 U. S. 615, 35
S. Ct. 422 (1915).
74, Illinois Central R. R. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co., 238 U. S. 275, 35 S. Ct.
760 (1915).
65
66
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ancing local needs against the effect of the regulation on interstate
commerce. The line between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" requirements in this sphere is obviously exceedingly difficult to draw.
Nevertheless the Court was obliged to undertake the task of preventing
"unreasonable" interference with interstate commerce by state regulation of internal matters. Professor Reynolds has shown how, in doing
this, it was passing on the question, essentially legislative in nature,
whether such interference with interstate transportation was reasonably
required to meet local needs. 75
STATE LEGISLATION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1921-1940)

During this later period the principles followed by the Supreme
Court changed but little from the preceding period. Some interesting
developments may be noted, however, in the type of subject matter
involved in these cases. State tax laws played an even larger part,.
relatively speaking, in the litigation before the Court.76 This is probably due to the increasingly frantic scramble of the states to find adequate sources of revenue, as well as to the fact that the law in respect to
state police power regulations was becoming more and more settled.
Cases which might be considered as involving regulation of health,
safety and morals numbered only twenty-one, while regulation of
rates and services of railroads and various other utilities formed the
basis of only twenty-three cases.
The attempt to find new tax sources is also mirrored in the fact that
while tax laws played an even more important role, legislation affecting
railroads, frequently before the Court in previous years, was much
less conspicuous.77 This is partly a result of the states' turning to new
fields of taxation, and also to some extent a consequence of the rapid
and progressive expropriation of the railroad field by the federal
government after the Transportation Act of 1920. Moreover, the law
in this field was becoming more settled as well, so that there was little
new legislation and few real controversies which reached the Supreme
Court.78
75 REYNOLDS, THE D1sTRIBUTION OF PowER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE CARRIERS

176-177 (1928).
There were 80 cases involving state taxation and the commerce clause before
the Supreme Court in this period; all other state cases arising in connection with the
commerce clause totalled only 59.
77
From 1890 to 1920 there had been 79 cases; from 1921 to 1940 there were
only 21.
78
This can be seen in the fact that of the laws involved in the 79 cases in 1 8901920, 32 were rnled unconstitutional; while in the 21 cases from 1921-1940 there were
only 3 findings of invalidity.
BETWEEN THE NATION AND THE STATES
76
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The venturing into new fields in tax legislation is reflected in the
fact that of the eighty state tax cases before the Supreme Court in this
period, twenty-six resulted in decisions of unconstitutionality. This
inference is confirmed when one turns to a consideration of the subj ects affected. In addition to the usual type of cases involving taxation
of express companies,79 gas companies,8° interstate ferries, 81 telephone
and telegraph companies,82 and bridges,83 this period saw several cases
of a variety not common in the Court previously. The increasing use
of extensive pipe lines for transportation of petroleum products brought
to the Court cases revolving around the taxation of these facilities.M
These decisions prohibited the taxation of gas and oil moving through
pipe lines in a continuous stream and destined beyond the state. One
case involving an air transport company is illustrative of the application of old principles to new subject matter. In this case a state gasoline tax of six cents per gallon was added by the seller to gasoline
bought by an air transport company for use in planes engaged in
interstate commerce. Chief Justice Hughes ruled the tax valid as not
constituting a "direct burden" on interstate commerce.85
By far the most numerous of the cases dealing with relatively new
subject matter in state taxation are those concerning motor trucks,
busses, motor vehicles, and automobile caravans.86 Most of these laws
relating to carriers required certificates of convenience and necessity
and imposed license taxes. A Massachusetts law of this kind applying
to persons operating busses in interstate as well as intrastate commerce
79

Southeastern Express Co. v. Robertson, 264 U. S. 535, 44 S. Ct. 421 (1924).
Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 639 (1927); East
Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U.S. 465, 51 S. Ct. 499 (1931); State Tax
Commission of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41, 52 S. Ct. 62
(1931).
81
Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
82 New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 2·80 U. S. 338, 50 S. Ct.
I I I (1930); Cooney v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384, 55 S. Ct.
477 (1935); Pacific Tel. Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 297 U.S. 403, 56
S. Ct. 522 (1936).
88 Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 287 U.S. 295, 53 S. Ct. 137 (1932); Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 294 U. S. 83, 55 S. Ct. 332 (1935).
84 Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265, 42 S. Ct. IOI (1921);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277, 42 S. Ct. 105 (1921).
85 Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 285 U.S. 147, 52
S. Ct. 340 (1932).
88 In all during this period there were 16 cases involving some kind of state regulation of motor vehicles challenged under the commerce clause.
so
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was upheld in 1927.87 A leading case in the same year concerned the
Ohio Motor Transportation Act of 1923.88 This legislation required
motor carriers to obtain a certificate from the state commission and to
pay a tax graduated according to the number of vehicles used. The law
was upheld even as applied against carriers in interstate commerce.
The Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, ruled that the tax was
not so large as to constitute an obstruction to interstate commerce. The
following year a Connecticut law levying a tax of one cent for each
mile of highway traversed by any motor carrier used in interstate
commerce, as an excise on the privilege of using the highway, was
upheld in an opinion by Justice Stone. 89 Following these principles, a
statute imposing annual license taxes on all private carriers operating
motor vehicles for hire was upheld,9° as was a New Mexico law exacting
a fee for the privilege of transporting motor vehicles, on their own
wheels, over state highways for the purpose of sale. n There were
instances of similar laws being held invalid, although usually because
of some special feature deemed objectionable.92 For example, one
such regulation required, as a prerequisite to licensing, the acquisition
of liability insurance to be furnished by a company authorized to do
business in the state. This was held invalid as applied to busses operating in interstate commerce.93
Some of this legislation concerning motor carriers did not take the
form of license taxes or privilege fees. Two leading cases of this kind
came before the Court in 1925. Buck v. Kuykendall 94 involved a
Washington statute prohibiting common carriers for hire from using
the public highways without a certificate from the state that such
operation was necessary for the public convenience. The state court
87

Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry., 273 U. S. 45, 47 S. Ct. 298
(1927).
88
Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 47 S. Ct. 702 (1927).
89
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 48 S. Ct. 230 (1928).
90
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 295 U. S. 295,
55 S. Ct. 709 (1935).
91
Morf v. Bingham, 298 U.S. 407, 56 S. Ct. 756 (1936).
92
Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502 (1928); Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 51 S. Ct. 380 (1931); Ingels v. Morf, 300
U. S. 290, 57 S. Ct. 439 (1937).
93
Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502 (1928).
9
' 267 U. S. 307, 45 S. Ct. 324 (1925). Similar legislation by South Carolina
regulating transportation by motor vehicles was upheld in an opinion by Chief Justice
Hughes in Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 54 S. Ct. 142 (1933). A Kansas law
licensing motor carriers and taxing them for the benefit of highways was upheld as
applied to delivery trucks, some of which were used in interstate commerce. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595 (1932).
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ruled that the statute applied to carriers operating exclusively in interstate commerce as well as to those engaged in intrastate operations.
The Supreme Court held that the statute, so interpreted, was unconstitutional. The same result was reached in Bush & Sons v. Maloy, 05
involving a similar situation arising under Maryland law. The only
point of difference was that in this second case federal aid highways
were not involved, but this distinction was not deemed relevant. 00
In a very interesting recent case, the Court split in striking down an
Arkansas tax, allocated for the maintenance of state highways, which
was imposed on each gallon of gas in excess of a certain amount brought
into the state by motor vehicles for use as fuel in such vehicles.97 The
opinions in this case are reserved for fuller discussion in the concluding
paragraphs of this paper.
Of the twenty-one cases affecting railroads in this period, nine had
to do with tax laws, all but one of which were sustained. In the only
invalidation of state tax laws as applied to railroads in this period, a
Washington tax of one-tenth of one per cent of gross operating revenu~
was condemned when levied against interstate roads. Justice Roberts
wrote the opinion, holding that the tax exceeded what was reasonably
required for inspection and supervision. 08 In a tax admittedly on
interstate railroads, said Justice Roberts, the burden of proof is on the
state to show that no obstruction to intersta.te commerce results. In
the other cases, familiar state tax laws regarding intangible property,° 0
franchise taxes based on property used or business done in the state,1° 0
income taxes based on income from property within the state,101 all
were upheld as legitimate exercises of state power. No new principles
were announced and no distinct trends are to be observed, except
95

267 U.S. 317, 45 S. Ct. 326, 327 (1925).
Regulations of maximum load allowed on carriers on state highways have been
sustained. See Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 548 (1927). Likewise the
Court recently sustained a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the operation over state
highways of vehicles carrying other vehicles over the head of the operator. Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1940).
97
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 60 S. Ct. 504 (1940).
98
Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 300 U. S. 154, 57 S. Ct. 397 (1937).
99
St. Louis & E. S. L. Electric Ry. v. Missouri, 256 U. S. 314, 41 S. Ct. 488
(1921).
100
St. Louis-S. F. Ry. v. Middlekamp, 256 U. S. 226, 41 S. Ct. 489 (1921);
Southern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 43 S. Ct. 192 (1923); General American
Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367, 46 S. Ct. 234 (1926).
101
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413, 43 S. Ct. 620 (1923);
Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U. S. 503, 49 S. Ct. 191 (1929); Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 56 S. Ct. 625 (1936).
96
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perhaps the lessening of the number of cases involving railroad taxation.102
Many of the tax cases in the period involved foreign business corporations operating in the state. Here also the principles laid down
earlier were followed without significant change. Taxes held to discriminate against foreign corporations were invalidated,103 as were
those nondiscriminatory taxes which were deemed to constitute a burden on interstate commerce.104 The Court continued to uphold taxes
on foreign corporations which it thought were based on reasonable
criteria and which therefore did not constitute a direct burden on interstate commerce.105 ln 1937, for example, the Court upheld an Alabama
law levying a franchise tax on all foreign corporations based on capital
employed in the state, although part of the property was used in
interstate commerce. Chief Justice Hughes declared that this was no
substantial burden on such commerce.106
The diversity of state activity in the tax field during this period is
shown in the wide variety of miscellaneous tax cases arising before the
Court, in addition to ·those already discussed relating to railroads,
utilities, motor vehicles, and foreign corporations.101 Taxes on a seat
on the New York Stock Exchange,108 on the business of mining,109 on
wholesale dealers in oil,110 on the "severance" of animal furs and skins,111
102 The other cases in this period in which railroads were involved revealed
familiar types of legislation. No important doctrinal changes are to be observed.
103 Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421, 41 S. Ct. 571 (1921).
104 Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 45 S. Ct. 12 (1924);
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184 (1924); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 45 S. Ct. 477 (1925); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460, 49 S. Ct. 204 (1929).
105 Bass, Ratcliffe & Gretton v. State Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82
(1924); International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429, 49 S. Ct. 380 (1929);
Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board, 297 U. S. 4u, 56 S. Ct. 553 (1936);
Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commr., 298 U. S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 887 (1936); Southern
Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696 (1937).
108 Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148, 57 S. Ct. 696 (1937).
See also Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority in Neirbo •Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939).
107 Franchise taxes on domestic corporations doing interstate business were usually
upheld. Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 44 S. Ct. 60 (1923); Western Cartridge
Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U.S. 5II, 50 S. Ct. 383 (1930). Cf. Virginia v. Imperial
Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15, 55 S. Ct. l 2 ( l 934).
108 Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 42 S. Ct. 15 (1921).
109 Oliver Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 43 S. Ct. 526 (1923), in which
it was held that mining is not interstate commerce.
110 Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 43 S. Ct. 643 (1923).
111 Lacoste v. Department of Conservation of Louisiana, 263 U. S. 545, 44 S. Ct.
186 (1924).
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on brokers and commission merchants,112 on gasoline used in fishing boats
in interstate commerce,118 on sales or storage of gasoline,114 on cattle held
temporarily in stockyards,115 on operating a cotton compress,116 and on
retail sales of all tangible property plus a "compensation tax" for the
privilege of using in the state tangible property purchased elsewhere
unless an equal tax has already been paid 117-all were upheld.
There remain to be treated the cases arising under the police power
exercised in the protection of health, safety, and morals of the various
states during this period. For the most part the pattern is the same as
that in the preceding period, with a few exceptions. For obvious reasons, the regulation of the liquor traffic played a very small part in
state legislation.118 The only other important characteristic, aside from
some of the individual cases involved, is the decreasing amount of
litigation in this category. While from 1890 to 1920 there were 69
cases, from 1921 to 1940 there were only 24, a disproportionately
small number. The ratio of unconstitutionality was maintained until
1937, with 7 of 19 resulting in the voiding of police power statutes,
compared to 23 out of 69 in the perious period. Since 1937 few have
been voided. The drop in the total number of cases may be due to the
progressive clarification of the law in many important spheres of such
state activity. For example, state inspection laws of various kind.5 had
provided no less than 20 cases in 1890 to 1920. By 1920 the law was
so well settled that few cases arose subsequently. From 1921 to 1937
there were only two cases involving this type of legislation, both of
them early in the period. The first 119 upheld a Georgia law imposing
112

Raley & Bros. v. Richardson, 264 U.S. 157, 44 S. Ct. 256 (1924).
Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 50 S. Ct. 169 (1930).
114
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631 (1932); Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345 (1933); Edelman v. Boeing
Air Transport, 289 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 591 (1933); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575 (1934); Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S.
169, 55 S. Ct. 358 (1935).
115
Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34 (1933).
116 Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 54 S. Ct. 267
(1934); see also Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584, 54 S. Ct. 541 (1934).
117
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937).
118 Only two cases reached the Court in this period 1921-1940. McCormick &
Co. v. Brown, 286 U. S. 131, 52 S. Ct. 522 (1932), reaffirmed the validity of the
Webb-Kenyon Act and upheld a state law forbidding the importation of products
containing ethyl alcohol. Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132, 60 S. Ct. 163 (1939),
upheld the Kentucky Alcohol Beverage Control Act forbidding the carriage of intoxicating liquors by carriers other than licensed common carriers, and forbidding distillers to deliver to unauthorized carriers.
119 Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 42 S. Ct. 375 (1922).
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inspection fees on petroleum products brought from out of state as
being reasonably adjusted to the costs of performing such inspection.
The second120 voided an Ohio statute levying an inspection fee on
petroleum products which produced revenues nearly double the cost
of inspection. These cases follow the settled law in such matters, and
indicate why this kind of litigation has declined in frequency. One of
the most recent of these cases 121 resulted in the invalidation of a Florida
statute requiring the inspection of imported cement and imposing a
fee which the Court deemed too high and therefore found to be an
unlawful discrimination against interstate commerce. Fewer cases arose
regarding quarantine laws 122 and railroad safety laws,128 for instance,
and the decisions followed the customary line. The chief characteristic
of importance with regard to police power legislation in this period is
the turning of the states to price-fixing and commodity control. Most
of these cases, however, were ar.gued chiefly under the due process
clause and as such fall outside the scope of this investigation. It is sufficient to refer briefly to the nature of the legislation and its commerce
clause implications. In Baldwin v. Seelig 124 the Court considered a
New York milk control statute. The law forbade the sale within the
state of milk bought outside at a price lower than that fixed by law in
New York. The purpose of this legislation was to protect the New
York milk market from out-of-state competition. A unanimous Court,
speaking through Justice Cardozo, found this an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.125 In a subsequent case, a Virginia milk
control act was held not to constitute such a burden.126 And in the same
year, 1937, a Georgia statute fixing maximum charges for the handling
and selling of leaf tobacco was upheld as against the contention, among
others, that it burdened interstate commerce.12•
120
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THE TREND TOWARD REINTERPRETATiqN

This brief survey of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
dormant commerce power with regard td state legislation in the last
half-century leads to several rather persistent conclusions. Let us, for
the sake of time and space, list them rapidly. (r) Judicial application
of the commerce clause to state legislation in the absence of Congressional action seems to have been unsatisfactory. (2) It is characterized
not only by doctrinal difficulties, which can be tolerated, but by important practical dangers, which probably will not be. (3) Among these
practical dangers the greatest is "death by tariff" 128-the problem of
interstate trade barriers growing rapidly despite the efforts of the
Supreme Court and the entire federal judiciary. ( 4) The fact that a
harmonious integration of exercised state powers with unexercised
federal power has not been evolved is no fault of the courts, which
within their limits have done splendid work in a tremendously complex
field. ( 5) The fault is to a considerable degree with Congress., which
has been content to let the courts struggle with the problem once they
had undertaken the task. ( 6) But the broader problem of integrating
state and national policy ( of which erection of trade barriers and competition for tax sources by the states are but individual, though very
significant, aspects) is essentially a problem for the legislative, or
political, or possibly even the amending power.129 From this point of
view, the Court has been attempting a task far beyond its powersone which was foredoomed to failure.
That failure did not become clearly apparent until rising revenue
needs, the scramble for tax sources, and the multiplication of state trade
barriers revealed the seriousness of the situation. The solution to the
problem may be a difficult one to find. Several suggestions have been
offered.130 But if the experience of the last fifty years means anything,
it means that the answer is not to be sought in judicial pronouncements
in individual cases while the legislature neglects its responsibility of
formulating a general policy.
If the preceding analysis has any validity, two broad alternatives
present themselves to the Supreme Court for the immediate future.
One is to continue the struggle to find and apply adequate criteria of
128 This phrase is borrowed from Raymond Leslie Buell's article of that name in
FoRTUNE, August 1938.
129
See, e.g., ELLIOTr, THE NEED FOR CoNSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1935).
180 See, e.g., the summary of possible steps listed by MELDER, STATE TRADE
WALLS 22-29 (1939) (Public Affairs Pamphlets, No. 37). Also the symposium in
207 ANNALS (1940).
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reasonableness in these cases, in the belief that by verbally exorcising
"undue burdens" on interstate commerce the situation can be fairly
satisfactorily dealt with. The other is to effect what amounts to a
withdrawal from a difficult and disadvantageous position requiring the
exercise of essentially legislative functions-for which the Court is
ill-suited by nature-and to leave to the national legislature the duty
of exercising positively its important powers in this sphere.
The latter alternative means in practice a refusal to invalidate
nondiscriminatory state legislation where the attack on the statute is
based on the judicially derived implications of the "still, small voice"
of the unexercised commerce power.131 It means, not that such refusal
will solve the problems of interstate trade barriers, but that the solution will be sought by the policy-making organs best fitted to find it.
The apparent trend toward such a reinterpretation of the commerce
clause with regard to state legislation on the part of the Supreme Court
is one of the most interesting phenomena to be observed in recent
decisions. It is too early to say whether it will find its way into the
dominant attitude of the Court. It has so far found explicit expression
only in dissents. But it appears to be making headway.
The most consi~tent and determined advocate of this p·osition on
the Court has been Justice Black.182 He had not been long on the bench
before he made his views on this matter unmistakably clear. In Adams
Manufacturing Company v Storen,m an Indiana gross income tax as
applied to income derived from sales in other states was ruled unconstitutional. Black dissented from the majority opinion of Justice Roberts holding such a tax to be a burden on interstate commerce. In a
long opinion, he pointed out that the tax was general in effect, that it did
not discriminate against interstate commerce and that it fell uniformly
on all gross incomes. Nor did it contravene any law of Congress. He
deplored the striking down of the statute because of "merely possible
future unfair burdens," and concluded
" ... Until Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over
interstate commerce, fixes a different policy, it would appear
desirable that the States should remain free to adopt tax systems
181
The phrase "the still, small voice of the commerce clause" is Professor Thomas
Reed Powell's. See Powell, "The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause," 3 SELECTED
EssAYS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 93 I ( I 93 8) {Association of American Law Schools).
182 See Barnett, "Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court," 8 UNiv. CHI. L.

REV. 20 (1940).
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304 U.S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938).
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imposing uniform and non-discriminatory taxes upon interstate
and intrastate business alike." 184
Again in Gwin, White & Prince v. H enneford,135 Justice Black
dissented from a majority opinion holding invalid a Washington tax
on gross receipts from the business of marketing fruit shipped in interstate and foreign commerce. In another long opinion he pointed out
that the statute imposed a general, nondiscriminatory tax measured
by gross receipts upon all business operating in the state. The tax as
passed fell equally upon all. With the exemption made by the majority
opinion, it would now become unequal, and intrastate business would
have to bear the whole burden. Until Congress acts, he urged again,
such taxes should be upheld.· He agreed with the majority as to the
possible dangers in such a-procedure, but he thought that Congress was
the agency responsible for remedying them when they arose. Said he,
"It is essential today, as at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, that commerce among the States and with foreign
nations be left free from discriminatory and retaliatory burdens
imposed by the States. It is of equal importance, however, that
the judicial department of our government scrupulously observe
its constitutional limitations and that Congress alone should adopt
a broad national policy of regulation-if otherwise valid state
laws combine to hamper the free flow of commerce. . .. Since the
Constitution grants sole and exclusive power to Congress to regulate commerce among the States, repeated assumption of this
power by the courts--even over a long period of years--could not
make this assumption of power constitutional." 136
These two cases were decided in 1938 and 1939, respectively. At
that time, Justice Black seemed to be alone in his views. Since then,
however, there have been definite indications of a shift within the
Court. And this is nowhere more clearly pointed out than in a dissenting opinion in a recent case in which the majority upheld a state tax by
applying the old formula of the extent of the "burden" on interstate
commerce. This was the case of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Company,1 37 decided in 1940. It involved a New York sales
tax of two per cent on all sales, as applied to coal delivered in New
York from Pennsylvania. The law levies the tax on the buyer, the
1

u Id., 304 U.S. at 327.

185

305 U.S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939).
ld., 305 U. S. at 455, 454.
187
309 U.S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388 (1940).

136

STATE TRADE LAWS

73

seller being liable only if he fails to collect and pay over the amount of
the tax. New York levied the tax on the purchasers of coal which had
been mined in Pennsylvania and sent to New York via New Jersey.
The purchasers protested on the ground that this was a tax on interstate
commerce. The majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Stone, ruled the tax valid as applied. While using the venerable
formula of the degree of "burden" on interstate commerce, Stone
nevertheless employed some language which suggested to observers
and to the minority of the Court itself that he was moving away from
the traditional view and moving closer to a position similar to that
outlined by Black in his earlier dissents. The tax in this case, said
Stone, is not aimed at nor does it discriminate against interstate commerce. Nor is it levied on interstate transportation, nor on the earnings
of interstate business, nor upon merchandise in the course of an interstate journey.

"If, as guides to decision, we look to the purpose of the commerce clause to protect interstate commerce from discriminatory
or destructive state action, and at the same time to the purpose of
the state taxing power under which interstate commerce admittedly must bear its fair share of state tax burdens, and to the
necessity of judicial reconciliation of these competing demands,
we can find no adequate ground for saying that the present tax is
a regulation which, in the absence of Congressional action the
commerce clause forbids." 188
The degree to which the majority opinion departed from the usual
rulings of the Court in these cases is seen in the sharp and forceful
dissent of Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices Roberts and McReynolds. "The case," said Hughes, "is one of interstate commerce in
its most obvious form." 139 After reviewing the provisions for the collection of the tax, he concluded that "From any point of view, the
tax now contested is laid upon interstate sales." 140 In seeking to answer
the growing tendency to apply the "nondiscriminatory" test to these
~tate taxes, the Chief Justice said pointedly that "it has long been
held by this Court in the interest of constitutional freedom of that
commerce that a direct tax upon it is not saved because the same or a
similar tax is laid also upon intrastate commerce." 141 And in response to
188
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the contention that these are essentially legislative problems, Chief
Justice Hughes remarked,
"Doubtless much can be said as to the desirability of a comprehensive system of taxation through the cooperation of the
Union and the States so as to avoid the differentiations which beset
the applications of the commerce clause and thus to protect both
state and national governments by a just and general scheme for
raising revenues. However important such a policy may be, it is
not a matter for this Court. We have the duty of maintaining the
immunity of interstate commerce as contemplated by the Constitution. That immunity still remains an essential buttress of the
Union; and a free national market, so far as it can be preserved
without violence to state power over the subjects within state
jurisdiction, is not less now than heretofore a vital concern of the
national economy." 142
The tax in this case, concluded the Chief Justice, "cannot be sustained
without abandoning principles long established and a host of precedents
soundly based." 143
The apparent shift to something approaching Black's view can be
seen in other cases. In one of these a corporate franchise tax on the
privilege of doing local business, based on the proportion of outstanding
capital stock, surplus and undivided profit, plus long-term obligations,
borne by the gross receipts from local business to the entire gross receipts, was upheld. Justice Reed, for the majority, ruled the law
valid as applying a reasonable formula. Justice McReynolds dissented.
Significant is the fact that in this case Justice Douglas joined Justice
Black in a separate concurrence. Presumably the latter two agreed that
the law was valid, but disagreed, in terms of Justice Black's earlier
opinions, with the application of the old formula and would hold the
law valid as a nondiscriminatory tax.144
This presumption receives added support from the alignment of
the justices in the most interesting recent case in this field. McCarroll
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines 145 produced disagreement on the bench
mildly reminiscent of pre-Civil War days. Justice McReynolds wrote
the majority opinion of the Court, with which no one else unre142
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servedly agreed. Justice Stone wrote a concurring opinion, with which
Justices Hughes, Roberts and Reed indicated their agreement. Justice
Frankfurter now joined Justices Douglas and Black in dissenting. Justice Murphy did not take part in the decision. The case involved an
Arkansas tax of six and one-half cents per gallon of gasoline, above
twenty gallons, brought into the state by motor vehicles for use as
fuel in the vehicle. The proceeds of the tax were allocated for the
maintenance of highways, and the tax was designed as a compensation
for the privilege of using the state roads. This litigation arose out of
the application of the levy to gas carried by interstate Greyhound motor
busses through the state for use as fuel in the course of their interstate
journey. Justice McReynolds ruled that the tax thus applied was
unconstitutional, since there was no necessary connection between the
amount of gas in the tanks of these vehicles and the number of miles
of state highway they would traverse. The Greyhound Company
in this case was willing to pay a tax on the gas to be consumed in the
state, but objected to paying the tax on the entire load. The facts of the
specific situation involved here showed that the busses arrived at the
Arkansas border with approximately seventy-seven gallons of gas in
their tanks and used about sixteen gallons in traversing Arkansas.
Under this law, however, they were to be taxed on their whole load
less twenty gallons, or on fifty-seven gallons. On this basis, Justice
McReynolds ruled that the tax could not be sustained as exacting
"reasonable compensation" for the use of the roads.
The minority opinion, expressing the views of Justices Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas, stressed again the view that the Court should
not interfere with nondiscriminatory state tax laws which a:ffect interstate commerce. Congress has not prohibited Arkansas from levying
such a tax for the use of its highways. And it does without doubt fall
almost exclusively upon the big trucks and busses-the vehicles which
cause the most wear and tear on the roads. The conflicting demands of
state taxation and the free flow of interstate commerce do present a
delicate situation. However, the minority feels
"· .. The making of these exacting adjustments is the business
of legislation-that of state legislatures and of Congress. This
Court has but a limited responsibility in that state legislation may
here be challenged if it discriminates against that interstate commerce or is hostile to the congressional grant of authority." 146
He Id., 309 U.S. at 184.
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The minority recognized that federal action should be taken. "Our
disagreement with the opinions just announced does not arise from a
belief that federal action is unnecessary to bring about appropriate
uniformity in regulations of interstate commerce. Indeed, state legislation recently before this Court indicates quite the contrary." m If
Congress does not act, however, neither can the Court. Courts do not
sit as legislatures. And, "As both the Union and the States are more
and more dependent upon the exercise of their taxing powers for
carrying on government, it becomes more and more important that
potential conflicts between state and national powers should not be
found where Congress has not found them, unless conflict is established
by demonstrable concreteness." 148
Thus has developed the split within the Supreme Court itself on
this question. The Chief Justice, while recognizing the possible desirability of a uniform national policy arrived at by the cooperation of
the nation and the states, maintains simply and firmly that "it is not a
matter for this Court." "We have," says the Chief Justice, "the duty of
maintaining the immunity of interstate commerce as contemplated by the
Constitution." 149 The other view is best summarized in a paragraph
taken from the minority opinion in the Greyhound case.
"Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative
regulations-must from inherent limitations of the judicial process
treat the subject by the hit-and-miss method of deciding single
local controversies upon evidence and information limited by the
narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford that full protection
for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution. We would,
therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the constantly
increasing barriers to trade among the States. Unconfined by 'the
narrow scope of judicial proceedings' Congress alone can, in the
exercise of its plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only consider whether such a tax as now under scrutiny
is consistent with the best interests of our national economy, but
can also on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects of a
complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the
147
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States and our Union. Diverse and interacting state laws may well
have created avoidable hardships. . .. But the remedy, if any is
called for, we think is within the ample reach of Congress." 150
It is probably fair to say that if this becomes the dominant Supreme
Court attitude, there will have been effected the most significant reinterpretation of the commerce clause with regard to state legislation
since the days of Chief Justice Taney. The half-century just concluded saw no basically new doctrines introduced. It saw mainly the
struggle to apply accepted doctrines to a rapidly changing industrial
and social context. This new tendency is perhaps comparable in significance to the Taney emphasis on "concurrent" powers over interstate commerce after the Marshall emphasis on exclusive federal power.
Indeed, a case could be made to show that this move is but part of a
larger trend toward what might be called a "new federalism"-a new
States Rights reminiscent of the Taney concern for the dignity of the
autonomous state, coupled with a new nationalism recognizing that the
Constitution as an instrument of government provides the authority to
meet national problems by national action. Along with this goes the
trend toward "laissez-faire for legislatures" and the increased emphasis on judicial self-restraint in dealing with the actions of other governmental agencies.151 If this is true, the Supreme Court is entering
upon a creative period comparable to but three or four others in its
entire history. This bids fair to be the most important development in
constitutional law since the turn of the century. In this development
many restrictions are being removed from state legislatures. Already
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity has been abandoned.
Already the due process clause has been reinterpreted to allow minimum wage and other social legislation. It is likely that the commerce
clause too will be so reinterpreted that, in its dormant condition at
least, it will operate as a less pervasive restriction on the attempts of
the states to find solutions for their own social and fiscal problems.
This would mean more freedom for state legislatures in matters in
which the national legislature had not acted. It would probably mean
a positive extension of national power through broader legislative use
of the commerce clause to deal with problems transcending state lines.
But it would leave for the policy-making organs the essentially legislative task of seeking to harmonize and integrate national and state
activities relating to interstate commerce.
150
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